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Abstract: This paper explores the theoretical framework of
judicial independence of international tribunals, with specific
reference to the independence of the European Court of Human
Rights. It then argues that independence is a key aspect of the
legitimacy of an international tribunal and suggests that legal reforms
designed to enhance the judicial independence of the European
Court of Human Rights should focus on the two main structural parts
of the Court, namely the judiciary and the Registry. This paper
analyses a number of proposed reforms that can make the European
Court of Human Rights more independent and credible. These
insights are applicable to other international judicial fora.
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I. Introduction
An international human rights tribunal which lacks
independence cannot be legitimate. An international tribunal
without legitimacy cannot be effective. International justice lacks a
mechanism for the coercive execution of judgments. Neither sheriff
nor enforcement officer exists to impose the will of an international
court on sovereign states, execution is almost always voluntary.' The
1. The Contracting Parties experience political pressure from the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe. However the effect of this pressure varies
depending on the size and importance of the Contracting Party concerned, and other
relevant considerations such as cost of execution. See Paul Mahoney, The
International Judiciary - Independence and Accountabiity, 7 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS
& TRIBUNALS 313, 317 (2008); see also DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
JUDGE. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S
CASES 149 (2007).
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Member States must first accept an international court as a legitimate
decision maker and only then can effective execution be secured.
This paper analyses the notion of independence in international
law. While the need for ensuring independence of justice is an axiom
in domestic legal systems, some commentators have argued this is not
the case in international law. This paper considers the latter argument
and concludes this approach is questionable in relation to
international law tribunals and totally unacceptable in the case of
human rights tribunals dealing with individual complaints. This
article argues independence is a requirement of the rule of law for
international adjudicators. Unbiased rulings enhance the trust of
stakeholders in an international tribunal. Independence is especially
important if the court can adjudicate claims against state institutions
because the state retains more influence over courts than private
parties by default.2
The primary focus of this paper is the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), which was created more than 50 years ago and is
currently the most successful international human rights tribunal in
the world. The ECtHR supervises compliance of the Contracting
Parties with the European Convention on Human Rights which
establishes a basic list of fundamental rights and freedoms. The
ECtHR has jurisdiction over 47 Contracting Parties.3 47 judges
elected in respect of every Contracting Parties can review individual
complaints brought against the Contracting Parties. This paper
argues the effectiveness of the Strasbourg system depends on its
legitimacy which, in the eyes of stakeholders, is inextricably linked to
the real and perceived independence of the Court.4
2. As Christopher Larkins argues, "judicial independence takes on critical
significance when the government is one of the parties to a dispute, as the case then
involves general issues of the rule of law. If the enforcement of this principle is to be
entrusted to the courts, then it is absolutely essential that judges not be biased in favor
of the government." Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and
Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 608
(1996).
3. Belarus is the last major European state that has not yet ratified the ECHR.
See COUNCIL EUR., RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN PRACTICE (2014), http://www.echr
.coe.int/Documents/PubcoeTeachingresourcesENG.pdf.
4. The legitimacy of the ECtHR is the subject that attracted substantial
academic attention in recent years. See, e.g., Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan
Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of Human Rights: Oitical
Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1707 (2011); BASAK
CAL I ET AL., THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
VIEW FROM THE GROUND (2011); Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimacy ofInternational
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The second section of this paper sets the theoretical framework for
inquiry into the independence of the international judiciary. It shows
the link between independence, the rule of law and the legitimacy of
international tribunals. It observes independence is important for
international tribunals adjudicating disputes between sovereign states,
but it is even more important in the case of international human rights
tribunals dealing with individual applications, such as the ECtHR. This
section then argues that the independence of the ECtHR depends on
two intrinsically linked but logically separable considerations. First, the
independence of the ECtHR judges should be secured. Second, the
Court's Registry should be independent.
The third section focuses on the independence of the ECtHR
judges who are the key decision-makers at the Court and collectively
determine the outcomes of the human rights disputes. Interference by
the national authorities is mostly possible at the national nomination
stage of the election process. Increased transparency and stakeholder-
involvement should be promoted at this stage. Moreover, it is
observed here that if the principle of national representation is
removed from the Convention, than the politically sensitive aspect of
the election process will wane. The principle of national
representation means that the judge elected in respect of a
Contracting Party will have to be on the bench when a case against
this Contracting Party is adjudicated by the Court. This principle
applies to Chambers of 7 judges and Grand Chambers of 17 judges
which deal with the most important cases. This paper advocates for
the removal of the principle of national representation from the
ECHR. Among other important aspects of judicial independence this
paper analyses judicial tenure, social security and immunities of
judges.
The fourth section explores an important but largely ignored
component of the independence of an international tribunal, the
independence of its personnel. In the case of the ECtHR this is called
Human Rights Review. The Case of the European Court of Human Rightsi, 40 J.
Soc. PHIL. 595 (2009); George Letsas, The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its
Meaning and Legitimacy, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 106 (Andreas
Follesdal et al. eds., 2013); Tom Zwart, More Human Rights than Court: Why the
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights is in Need of Repair and How It
Can Be Done, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DisCONTENTS
(Spyridon Flogaitis et al. eds. 2013); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Does Consensus Matter?
Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human
Rights, PUB. L. 534 (2011).
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the Registry. This paper argues that independence should not only be
secured from external actors but also from the political branches of
the Council of Europe-the parent organisation of the ECtHR. Key
areas for securing the independence of the Registry mostly repose in
the areas of human resource management and the financial autonomy
of the Court. This paper discusses the recruitment policy of the Court
and the Council of Europe, the use of seconded lawyers in the
Registry and considers the budgetary independence of the Court.
II. The Theoretical Importance of Judicial Independence in
International Law
Judicial independence in international law is in purgatory. This
may be somewhat surprising given the judicial independence of
domestic courts is recognised as a cornerstone of modern legal
systems and is relatively uncontroversial. Posner and Yoo argue
international tribunals are more effective if staffed by judges who can
be influenced by the State-parties. Only then will the judges be
forced to find a solution that will best serve the interest of both
6parties.
Helfer and Slaughter are unconvinced by this argument; they
observe that "[i]ndependent tribunals act as trustees to enhance the
credibility of international commitments in specific multilateral
contexts."7  Moreover, they argue that independent tribunals are
more detached from the momentary interests of the parties and
tribunals and they are likely to advance states' long-term interests.
While the argument elaborated by Posner and Yoo may have
5. See, e.g., E.S.C. Res. 2006/23, U.N. Doc/ E/RES/2006/23 (July 27, 2006);
Piersack v. Belgium, No. 8692/79, 5 E.H.R.R. 169, 179 (1983). See also Shimon
Shetreet, Standards of Conduct of International Judges: Outside Activities, 2 L. &
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 127, 128 (2003); Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to
Promote the Independence and Accountability of International Tribunal, 2 L. &
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 27, 27 (2003); TERRIS, supra note 1, at 147; Erik
Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European
Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. Sc. R. 417, 417 (2008); John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 353, 354 (1998-1999).
6. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International
Tibunals, 93 CALIF. L.REV. 1, 27 (2005).
7. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 899, 904 (2005).
8. Id. at 6-7.
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some foundation in classical international law tribunals which deal
with cases between state parties, this argument is inapplicable to
human rights tribunals which can accept individual complaints against
State Parties.9 In fact, the overwhelming majority of commentators
argue that international tribunals should indeed be independent to
fulfil their mission effectively.'o
The multivalent nature of an international tribunal that interacts
with both States and individuals means that such tribunals operate
from a position of overlapping legitimacies; they must appear
legitimate to all applicants, not merely to State actors." A court that
seeks to protect state parties' interests alone crucially undermines its
legitimacy with individual applicants, and it cannot maintain "diffuse
12
support" from the public. The ECtHR is increasingly
conceptualised as a constitutionalist court1 3 which should not only
9. Posner and Yoo have discussed the ECtHR in their study but did not arrive
at a firm conclusion as to whether the ECtHR also fits into their model. See Posner
& Yoo, supra note 6, at 63-67.
10. Judge Julia Laffranque of the ECtHR notes, "judges draw their legitimacy
from the law, which requires them to be independent and impartial." Julia
Laffranque, Judicial Independence - as Natural as the Air We Breath, in
DOMMERNES UAVHENGIGHEIT 327, 327-328 (Nils Asbjorn Engstad et al. eds. 2012).
Eyal Benvinisti and George Downs argue that legitimacy of international tribunals is
"critically tied to the extent to which they are viewed as independent." See Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Prospects for the Increased Independence of
International Tribunals, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1057, 1057 (2011).
11. Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke argue that there is a new
cosmopolitan approach to operations of international tribunals: "[it takes the
individual citizen to be the ultimate reference point in the justification of public
authority and invests it with a national as well as a cosmopolitan identity." Armin
von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International
Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 7, 34
(2012).
12. Shai Dothan states, "'diffuse support' ... measures whether the public is
generally inclined to accept a court's judgments, even if they disagree with a specific
judgment." Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 14
THEO. INQ. L. 455, 456 (2013); see also, James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira &
Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose?
Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187,
188 (2005) (discussing "diffuse support").
13. There is a tendency in academic literature to accept that the ECtHR is a
constitutionalist court. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, in ON LAW,
POLITICs, & JUDICIALIZATION 155 (2002); see also Fiona de Londras, Dual
Functionality and the Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights Eur.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 38 (2013); Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber, Revisiting the
Debate about 'Constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rights 12 HuM.
RTS. L. REV. 655 (2012); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Restructuring the
European Court of Human Rights: Preserving the nght of Individual Petition and
276 [Vol. 37:2
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find a solution capable of satisfying the interests of the State parties,
but must also look for a solution which will enhance human rights
14protection in Europe. This means the ECtHR must be independent
in order to secure legitimacy.'5
Paul Mahoney also argued that the Contracting Parties benefit
from independent human rights courts:
[Tihe truly independent international judicial control of national
action in the field of human rights is not only of occasional benefit
for the few individuals who once in a while "win" a case but also
one means (among many others, of course) of strengthening and
developing a healthy, dynamic democratic society.16
An independent international tribunal not only strengthens the
legitimacy of the tribunal itself, but also strengthens the national legal
system."
Furthermore, independence is an inherent aspect of the rule of
law. Academic discussions of the rule of law typically separate it into
two conceptions: a thick conception, which incorporates substantive
elements, and a thin conception, which focuses on more formal
elements. The importance of an independent judiciary is conceded by
both schools of thought. In the formal school, Joseph Raz argues:
The rules concerning the independence of the judiciary-the
method of appointing judges, their security of tenure, the way of
fixing their salaries, and other conditions of service-are designed
to guarantee that they will be free from extraneous pressures and
independent of all authority save that of the law. They are,
Promoting Constitutionalism, PUB. L. 711 (2013).
14. In 2003, international human rights NGO Interights published a report about
independence of the ECtHR. Interights experts stated that the Court's independence
is important because, "the Court's law and practice has increasing influence on the
law and practice of the Member States, assuming a quasi-constitutional nature that
underlines the importance of the standards maintained by the Court itself." JUTrTA
LIMBACH ET AL., JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS
TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2003) (discussing the Interights
report).
15. Lord Hoffmann, for instance, emphasized the drawbacks in elections to the
ECtHR. This led him to conclude that, "to the people of the United Kingdom, this
judicial body [the ECtHR] does not enjoy the constitutional legitimacy." Leonard
Hoffmann, The Universality of Human Rights, 125 LAW Q. REV. 416, 429 (2009).
16. Paul Mahoney, Parting Thoughts of an Outgoing Registrar of the European
Court ofHuman Rights, 26 HuM. RTS. L.J. 345, 345 (2005).
17. This is particularly the case in young democracies. See Andrew Moravcsik,
The Ongins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,
54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
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therefore, essential for the preservation of the rule of law.18
Similarly, proponents of the thick conception such as Tom Bingham
recognise the importance of an independent judiciary for the rule of
law. The "rule of law" is mentioned as part of the common heritage
of the signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights in
the Preamble. It therefore forms part of the value framework of
Convention jurisprudence.
Judicial independence is required by the rule of law20 and is
"indissociable from the very concept of justice." 21 Consequentially,
more than a dozen international conventions, regulations and
protocols codify the standards of independence of domestic courts.22
One must now consider which standards should be applicable to
international judges: should existing national standards be adopted or
should new standards be created?
This paper argues that the elaboration of the standards of judicial
independence in the ECtHR has often occurred without
consideration of the insights which national court independence can
provide. The development of standards designed to protect
independence, while recognising the special supranational nature of
18. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw 217 (1979).
19. Tom Bingham, The Rule ofLaw, 66 CALIF. L. REV 67, 80 (2007).
20. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 317.
21. Id. at 316.
22. See, e.g., SHIMON SHETREET & JULES DESCHENES, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 139 - 42, 481, 489, 490, (Shimon Shetreet & Jules
Deschenes eds., 1985) (discussing in detail, Syracuse Draft Pnnciples on the
Independence of the Judiciary Adopted at Syracuse, Sicily (1981), the Universal
Declaration on the Independence of Justice Adopted at Montreal, Canada (1983)).
See also United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary G.A.
Res. 40/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985); COUNCIL EUR., EUROPEAN
CHARTER ON THE STATUTE FOR JUDGES AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (1998)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/European-Charter-
on-Statute-of-JudgesEN.pdf;
COMMENTARY ON THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007),
http://www.unrol.org/files/publications cnodc_ commentary-E[1].pdf. A number of
documents were adopted by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE).
See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL EUR. JUDGES, MAGNA CARTA OF JUDGES (2010)
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1707925; CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL EUR. JUDGES,
FOR THE ATENTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
ON STANDARDS CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE
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the ECtHR means direct transposition of national standards is not
23
always appropriate, should take due account of those national
protections. We offer a number of proposed reforms based on a
synthesis of national and supranational considerations.
A. Unique Features of Supranational Systems
There are a number of features of a supranational legal system
which mean the direct transposition of national standards is not
always suitable. One such feature is how the judgments of the
ECtHR are enforced. Since the ECtHR cannot coercively implement
its decisions, the Contracting Parties must still accept the legitimacy
of the Court's judgments even when the Court rules against them. It
is technically correct that national courts often cannot sticto sensu
enforce their judgments and have to rely on the executive branch of
Government to do so.24 Nonetheless, national courts usually have
more clear remedies entrenched in their national constitutional
architecture. Therefore, the judgments of domestic courts are nearly
always automatically executed. In the case of international tribunals,
the execution of judgments is more complex, and the Contracting
Parties generally have to accept and execute them. Therefore, Terris,
Romano and Swigart argue "the work of international courts can
never be entirely divorced from the world of international politics." 2 5
The ECtHR deals with sovereign states and the "capacity of
international courts to flourish depends on the support of the
States."2 6 This tension must be borne in mind when considering the
development of standards designed to protect the independence of
international judges.
Another difference between national and international judges is
that the independence of the latter should be guarded from the
23. Mahoney has pointed out that, "[a]s a matter of principle, standards of
judicial independence [of international courts are] analogous, though not necessarily
identical, to those applicable to national judges apply to international judges."
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 315 and 346. Laffranque also claims that the principles
and standards created for the judiciary of the Member States should not be forgotten
in relation to independence of the ECtHR. Laffranque, supra note 10, at 338. See
also, Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 10, at 1058.
24. There are, of course, famous instances where the executive branches of
national governments have simply refused to execute a decision. See, e.g., Ex Parte
Merryman (1861) 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
25. TERRIS, supra note 1, at xxi.
26. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 318.
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interventions of multiple States. Such pressure from multiple States
can be more effective than an intervention by a single State. In the
(in)famous case of Lautsi and others vltalythe Court had to decide if
the mandatory display of crucifixes in Italian public schools violated
Article 9 of the ECHR (freedom of religion).2 The Governments of
2910 Contracting Parties intervened at the Grand Chamber stage with
third party submissions. In this case the Grand Chamber reversed the
chamber decision and found no violation.
The relative infrequency of such interventions means that this
threat to the independence of the ECtHR has not appeared
particularly pressing. This may change with the accession of the EU to
the ECtHR. First, the ECtHR will have to take into account what the
EU has decided because it will represent 29 Contracting Parties to the
Convention.30 This is likely to be accorded particular importance in
relation to the ascertainment of European consensus.31 Second, the
accession may provide greater possibilities of collective action
approaches by national States. An agreed strategy by European-wide
groupings such as the European People's Party or the Progressive
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats could result in concerted
submissions by the national State Governments, which belong to those
groupings.
B. The Standard of Judicial Independence
One further difficulty in any attempt to consider the application
of judicial independence to the ECtHR is that there is no consensus
on the definition of judicial independence.32 We proceed on the basis
of the Commentary on the Bangalore principle of judicial conduct,33
27. Shetreet, supra note 5, at 129 and 148.
28. Lautsi and others v. Italy, 54 Eur.. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).
29. Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania,
Malta, Monaco, Romania and the Republic of San Marino.
30. 28 Member States of the EU and the EU itself.
31. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Pavel Repyeuski, European Consensus and
the EU Accession to the ECHR, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR (Vasiliki
Kosta et al. eds. 2014).
32. While most of the definitions contain similar aspects, there is no single
universally accepted definition. As such, Larkins argued that judicial independence
is "one of the least understood concepts of political science and law." Larkins, supra
note 2, at 607.
33. The United Nations Social and Economic Council, by resolution 2006/23, has
invited member States consistent with their domestic legal systems to encourage their
judiciaries to take into consideration the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
[Vol. 37:2280
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which explains:
Judicial independence refers to both the individual and the
institutional independence required for decision-making. Judicial
independence is, therefore, both a state of mind and a set of
institutional and operational arrangements. The former is
concerned with the judge's independence in fact; the latter with
defining the relationships between the judiciary and others,
particularly the other branches of government, so as to assure both
the reality and the appearance of independence. The relationship
between these two aspects of judicial independence is that an
individual judge may possess that state of mind, but if the court
over which he or she presides is not independent of the other
branches of government in what is essential to its functions, the
judge cannot be said to be independent.3 4
On various occasions the ECtHR assessed the independence of
domestic tribunals and elaborated a set of criteria for independence.
In Langborger v Sweden the ECtHR stated that "in order to establish
whether a body can be considered 'independent,' regard must be had,
inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their
term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside pressures
and to the question whether the body presents an appearance of
independence."3 5 The Court has elaborated the basic principles of
judicial independence but as Paul Mahoney observes international
tribunals are reluctant to affirm the applicability of these principles to
36
an assessment of their own independence. Nonetheless the
Langborger criteria provide a useful metric to assess whether the
judiciary of the ECtHR is independent.
C. Independence of the ECIHR
Many external commentators agree that the ECtHR "presents an
when reviewing or developing rules with respect to the professional and ethical
conduct of the members of the judiciary. U.N. Economic and Social Council Res.
2006/23: Strengthening Basic Principles of Judicial Conduct, E/RES/2006/23 (July, 23
2006), available athttp://www.refworld.org/docid/46c455abO.html.
34. Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY GROUP, http://www.judicialintegritygroup.org/index.php/jig-resources/jig-
documents (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
35. Langborger v. Sweden, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 416 at 32 (1990); see also Ben
Olbourne, Independence and Impartiality: International Standards for national
Judges and Courts, 2 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTs. & TRIBUNALS 97, 109--113 (2003)
(discussion of the standards for judicial independence elaborated by the ECtHR).
36. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 317.
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appearance of independence." Dzehtsiarou has canvassed the
opinion of 50 lawyers and NGO activists from Russia, Moldova,
Azerbaijan, and Ukraine about judicial independence. The participants
were first asked whether they consider their domestic courts to be
independent. Only about 5% of participants answered "yes" to this
38question. The participants were then asked if they consider the
ECtHR more independent than their domestic courts, and all
participants answered they believed the ECtHR is more independent.
These results were confirmed by semi-structured interviews with the
lawyers from Moldova which revealed that trust in domestic judicial
institutions is very low. The vast majority of Moldovan lawyers,
however, perceive the ECtHR as an independent court. Moldovan
lawyers were asked the open question "why do you consider the
ECtHR more independent?" and the following answers were most
prevalent:
1) remoteness from the parties,
2) judges are from different countries and the bias of one
judge can be mitigated by other judges,
3) there are usually better safeguards of independence than
for local judges,
4) there is a clear procedure and good convincing reasoning
of the judgments.
Some participants have observed that the ECtHR is indeed more
independent than national Courts but that it is not absolutely
independent. One of the lawyers of the ECtHR explained that
[I]ndependence of the Court is secured by the modus operandi of
the Court meaning that there are too many people (judges and
lawyers) involved in the Court's adjudication and if one person is
biased it is normally rectified by the others. Moreover, the fact that
the Court is geographically remote from the parties to the case also
helps. State interference is normally not justified because the major
part of the Court's docket consists of repetitive cases of low
importance. It is also unwise for the private parties to try to
influence the Court because the Court proceedings are long and the
just compensation is usually relatively small.39
37. See Voeten, supra note 5; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 21; Posner &
Yoo, supra note 6, at 63.
38. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with lawyers from Russia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
39. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interview with a lawyer of the ECtHR Registry.
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Furthermore, academics such as Voeten argue that national
governments themselves may have reasons to appoint activist judges
who can bolster judicial independence.40 First, national governments
that favour European integration tend to appoint more independent
judges.41 Second, countries which seek to become members of the
EU may try to signal their adherence to international human rights
42
standards by appointing independent judges.
Given the positive response by interviewees to these questions
and the fact that national governments often favour judicial
independence, Europeans must consider whether there is any need to
alter the current system of judicial independence in the ECtHR.
First, perceived independence is obviously a relative concept, and it
seems likely that lawyers in countries with more robust domestic
human rights protections will have different responses to the ECtHR
compared to those in more newly fledged democracies. Second, some
commentators have expressed concerns about different areas relating
to judicial independence in the ECtHR including, for instance, the
election of judges.43 Third, there have been a few cases reported
when a judge of the Court were publicly and personally criticised for
their decisions," or as in case with Judge Wildhaber 45 has even been
40. Voeten, supra note 5.
41. Id. at 697.
42. Id. at 678 - 679, 697.
43. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 18 (calling the national nomination of candidates,
"unclear, apparently politicised and unaccountable.").
44. Voeten lists a few instances of such influence. Voeten, supra note 5, 419-422.
(Voeten describes how, for example, the British tabloid The Sun calling the judges of
the ECtHR "Euro clowns," or the Albanian opposition party expressed
embarrassment for the vote of the Albanian judge in the case of Abu-Hamsa.)
45. Luke Harding, I Was Poisoned by Russians, Human Rights Judge Says, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2007) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/fe
b/l01/russia.topstories3. In the interview published by the European Human Rights
Law Review, Judge Wildhaber asked rhetorically, "Is there any reason to suspect
that someone tried to poison me? Look, I had repeated clashes and disagreements
with the Russians and I think this was inevitable. If you have people who come into
your office in Strasbourg and tell you that you should order the judges about how to
vote in a given case, or the Head of State sends you a message about what should
happen in another case, you are bound to have disagreements. But is that enough to
want to kill someone? I should say no. So my conclusion is this: I had septicaemia.
We do not know how it originated. That does not mean I was poisoned." Steven
Greer, Reflections of a former President of the European Court of Human Rights,
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 165, 169-170 (2010). Examples of such direct influence are
rare. "I have never experienced nor heard any other judge talk of any pressure or
effort from either his government or one of the parties or anything of that kind," says
a veteran of one of the European Courts. "As far as my own government is
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allegedly poisoned in Russia. If the court delivers unpopular
judgments, the Court as an institution, or even the individual judges
can become targets of very unfair critiques.46 Fourth, Benvenisti and
Downs argue that the more influential a court becomes the more its
independence will be threatened.4 7 Since the Court's importance and
weight continues to grow,4 attempts to intervene in the Court's
functioning will increase. Moreover, the early threats to the Court's
independence, such as the threat to denounce the Convention, are
likely be superseded by more subtle methods of interference (except
in the case of Judge Wildhaber, where the interference was more
direct). 49 Fifth, the fact that there are too many people for one
national government to systematically influence the decisions of the
ECtHR in its favour does not mean it is not possible for national
governments to influence split decisions, because a national judge is
always appointed to hear a case.50 Finally, the changing institutional
nature of the Court in light of the changes in the tenure of the judges
of the Court and increase in personnel of the registry, and the
accession of new, influential, signatories to the Convention means
that new vistas of interference have opened up which the current
institutional framework may be inadequate to protect against.
This paper will discuss the organisational and architectural
safeguards of judicial independence. Judicial independence cannot
be guaranteed only by measures like security of tenure or a proper
social security system for judges and judicial assistants. These
concerned" says another European judge, "I am in a most felicitous situation of being
able to say I have never had a phone call from my government nor did I have any
phone calls from the attorneys of the applicants. That's really very comfortable."
TERRIS, supra note 1, at 150. Recently retired Russian judge Judge Kovler also
stated that he has never been subjected to "administrative pressure" from Russia.
Anatoly Kovler, When One Disagrees One Should Remain Professional: Interview
with Judge Anatoly Kovier, 5 INT'L JUST. J. (in Russian) 66, 68 (2013). Judges of the
ECtHR interviewed by the author have also expressed similar views.
46. Ferejohn, supra note 5, at 374.
47. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 10, at 1060.
48. Shapiro and Stone Sweet conclude that the ECtHR "has rendered enough
judgments that have caused enough changes in state practices so that it can be
counted to a rather high degree as a constitutional review court." Shapiro & Stone
Sweet, supra note 13, at 155.
49. ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 311 (2010). Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, Towards a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273, 367 (1997).
50. See Voeten, supra note 5, at 426.
51. McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 105,106 (2006).
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conditions are necessary but not sufficient to establish true judicial
independence.
Some commentators argue that the Court's independence waxes
and wanes, and it depends on "political competition which] plays a
key role in determining judicial independence [ . ]." 2 It has been
argued the independence and effectiveness of the Court can be
enhanced by the judicial strategies it deploys in its judgments.53 This
paper will not analyse this aspect of judicial independence since in
order to discuss these more advanced elements of judicial
independence one should first put in place some basic legal
safeguards.
Legal safeguards of the independence of the ECtHR should be
divided into two categories, depending on whether they guarantee the
independence of judges or the independence of the ECtHR beyond
merely judicial independence. The independence of the judiciary is at
the forefront of every discussion of the independence of the Court.
The Council of Europe has made significant progress in securing the
independence of judges. It does not mean that nothing more can be
done in this area but it is already densely populated by legal norms
and regulations.
The second category of measures secures the independence of
the Court beyond the membership of the bench itself. As the
Working Paper on the Conclusions of the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Legal Profession under the Rule of Law noted: "It is ...
important to have regard to the independence not only of the judge
but also of the Judiciary as an institution; the latter may provide
traditions and a sense of corporate responsibility which are a stronger
guarantee of independence than the private conscience of the
individual judge." 5 In the context of the ECtHR, it is impossible to
consider the corporate responsibility of the Court without due
consideration of the role of the Registry. It maintains the institutional
52. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 10, at 1071.
53. "Independent international tribunals have been able to further increase
interstate competition by weighing in on behalf of weaker state interests rather than
operating as the agents of powerful states as they would have been forced to do
under conditions of dependency." Id. at 1078. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in
the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 115 (2011) (discussing
various strategies available to the ECtHR).
54. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 327.
55. INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS, The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report
on the International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, India (1959).
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memory of the Court. The judges of the Court are on the bench for
only 9 years.56 Some lawyers in the Registry have permanent contracts
and stay in the Court for much longer terms. For instance, Erik
Fribergh the current Registrar of the Court has been working first in
the Commission and then the Court since 1981." The institutional
importance of the Registry has been recognised by the Judiciary of the
ECtHR; one judge interviewed noted "the way the system is now with
the registry which is permanent, the registry is extremely strong,
extremely powerful."5 8  Moreover, the role of the Registry is much
more important than the provision of simple administrative support.
The Registry plays a larger role in ensuring the legitimacy of the
structure of the ECHR. Tyler has demonstrated the most important
element that affects individuals in legal disputes is the process by which
their case is handled.59  The most important considerations in
determining whether a legal procedure is viewed as fair or not include:
participation, trustworthiness, interpersonal respect, and neutrality.60
Any elements of the composition of the Registry or the ECtHR which
undermine these elements pose a potential problem for the perceived
legitimacy of the ECtHR as a whole.
This category also includes the institutional autonomy of the Court
from the Council of Europe. The Council is a political organisation
comprised of the Member States' representatives. One should not forget
that the States are the parties in the cases heard by the ECtHR. It is
surprising that the issue of administrative autonomy of the Court has not
been much discussed in academic literature until recently.61
I. The Independence of the Judges of the ECtHR
One major threat to the independence of the judiciary of the
56. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Sept. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222.
57. Judges of the Court, EUR. CT. HUM. RTs., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/E
N/Header/The+Court/The+Court/Judges+of+the+Court/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
58. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
59. Tom Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 882 (1997).
60. Id. at 887-892. These considerations hold through in heterogeneous societies.
See generally Tom Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer
toLawandto Legal A uthorities, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 983 (2000).
61. Laffranque argues that, "[i]t might be very surprising at first glance that, e.g.,
talks about administrative autonomy of the European Court of Human Rights from
the Council of Europe are only recently, and in a very cumbersome way, beginning to
take concrete shape." Laffranque, supra note 10, at 337.
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ECtHR is national representation, the process by which a judge
elected from a Member State is automatically appointed in any case
to which the Members State is the respondent. This process can give
the Member States a false impression judges should act to represent
the interests of the country to which they are a national. Although
Posner and Yoo believe this is one of the sole grounds on which the
legitimacy of international human rights tribunals rests, we argue such
a cramped conception of legitimacy should be rejected. In fact, the
legitimacy of the ECtHR is undermined if it rests solely on Posner
62
and Yoo's conception of legitimacy.
The ability of Member States to promote their interests in the
Court is most powerful during the election process. States gain an
advantage through the monopolisation of relevant information by
Member State Governments, preventing informed decision-making,
nominating partisan candidates, and other processes such as lobbying.
This article advocates an approach based on the principles of
transparency and informed assent by the members of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Such a
system can further legitimise the ECtHR. This paper identifies how
national representation distorts the election process and advocates
the abolition of the national representation procedure. However,
national representation might not be abandoned for political or policy
reasons. If it cannot be eliminated, other checks should be
introduced in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary.
A. Election of the Judges
The manner in which a judge is appointed or elected presents
one of the key areas in which political manipulation can occur.63 The
election of the judges is one of the cornerstones of the judicial
independence of any court, including the ECtHR. These elections
have evolved from simply rubber-stamping the choice of the Member
States by the PACE to more insightful consideration and meritorious
62. See also Dzehtsiarou, supra note 4.
63. Limbach argues that the "appointment procedures impact directly upon the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Since the legitimacy and credibility of
any judicial institution depends upon public confidence in its independence, it is
imperative that appointment procedures for judicial office conform to - and are seen
to conform to -international standards on judicial independence." LIMBACH, supra
note 14, at 6. According to Burbank, "'the political branches' control of the judicial
appointments process poses. . . a threat to judicial independence." Pamela S. Karlan,
Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 535, 545 (1998-1999).
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assessment of the candidates. Despite this development, the selection
of judges by the PACE has recently been called a "Byzantine
appointments procedure."6" The procedure of the election of the
judges should be further improved.
The election of the judges of the ECtHR is a three stage process.
A Member State first nominates three candidates for the position of
judge. The second stage is an interview with the candidates conducted
by the special Sub-Committee of the PACE. The Sub-Committee can
suggest to the PACE to return the list to the Member State, if the list,
for instance, contains only one 'real candidate' or if it is not gender
balanced. The authority of the PACE to do so was confirmed by the
65ECtHR in an advisory opinion. If there are no reasons for rejection,
the Sub-Committee passes the list to the PACE and encloses a
confidential report with its evaluation of the candidates. The final
stage of the appointment procedure is to hold an election where the
PACE can vote twice: the judge is elected during the first round if one
of the candidates receives an absolute majority of votes. If nobody
receives an absolute majority, a simple majority is sufficient in the
second round.6
1. Nomination
The first stage of the election procedure-nomination of the
candidates-is crucial, and the quality of nomination at the national
level will determine the quality of the judge ultimately elected by the
64. Owen Bowcott, Paul Mahoney Appointed UK's New Judge in Strasbourg,
THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 18:37 EDT), http://www.thegu
ardian.com/law/2012/jun/27 /paul-mahoney-european-court-judge.
65. Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of
Candidates Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court
of Human Rights, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
66. EUR. PARL. Ass., RESOLUTION 1726 ON THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERLAKEN PROCESS, para. 8
(2010); see also EUR. PAR. Ass., COMMITrEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS PROCEDURE FOR ELECTING JUDGES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS INFORMATION DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT (2014)
[hereinafter Committee on Legal Affairs Report], http://asse
mbly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2014/ ajinfdoc03 2014.pdf ("The candidate having
obtained an absolute majority of votes cast is declared elected a member of the
Court. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority, a second ballot is held, after
which the candidate who has obtained a relative majority of votes cast is declared
elected. Election results are publicly announced by the President of the Assembly
during the part-session.") (citing Resolution 1726).
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PACE.67 This stage is troublesome for primarily two reasons.
Despite the importance of this stage, it is often seen as the most
troublesome element of the election procedure for two main reasons.
First, the Convention does not provide detailed criteria for office.
Although the Council of Europe has since provided some guidance
on this issue, this has been criticized and has been the subject of
68political controversy. Second, some procedures at national level
might be politically motivated. The fact the candidates are
nominated by political institutions makes some political influence
inevitable, but more importantly, there is a lack of transparency in
how the selections are made. The stakes are elevated for the Member
States, because they know any appointee will sit on cases that affect
it. The influence of Member States on sitting judges is likely to be
largely illusory due to the strong collegial independence which the
European Court enjoys, but is immaterial if the national government
perceives it to be otherwise.
The lack of detailed criteria for office is comparatively easy to
rectify. Pursuant to article 21(1) the judges shall be of high moral
character and must either possess the qualifications required for
appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised
competence. These criteria are broad and call for further elaboration.
The Committee of Ministers has developed guidelines on the
selection of candidates for the post of judge at the ECtHR that must
be implemented by the Contracting Parties. The guidelines explain
the essential qualities the candidates should possess: apart from those
mentioned in the Convention, the candidates need to have knowledge
67. It is worth mentioning that two factors may have contribution to defects in
the election process: (1) a lack of precise criteria about training in the area of human
rights, and (2) deficient language competence contributed to some defects in election
process. See Loukis G. Loucaides, Reflections of a Former European Court of
Human Rights Judge on His Expeiences as a Judge, 1 ROMA RIGHTS (2010),
available at http://www.errc.org/roma-rights-journal/roma-rights-1-2010-implemen
tation-of-judgments/3613/8.
68. The Council of Europe requires that the list submitted is gender balanced.
See EUR. PARL. Ass., RESOLUTION 1366 ON CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/RoP/RoP-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?id=ENCEGCAIFG#Format-It ("[T]he political groups, when nominating
their representatives to the sub-committee, should aim to include at least 40%
women, which is the parity threshold deemed necessary by the Council of Europe to
exclude possible gender bias in decision-making processes."). The list from Malta
was therefore rejected due to the fact that it contained only male candidates for the
position of a judge. The Maltese authorities expressed their concerns by this
rejection and the ECtHR had to deliver an advisory opinion on the issue. See
Advisory Opinion, supra note 65, at para. 14.
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of the national legal system(s) and of public international law. The
candidates should not engage in any activity incompatible with their
independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office if
elected, for the duration of their term of office.69
The removal of the national representation requirement would
considerably lessen any partisan interest a national government might
have in the nomination of a judge, as they could not be certain the
judge would sit on cases where it was a respondent. Moreover, the
domestic nomination procedures should be modified to ensure that
they are all transparent and politically neutral.70 The Committee of
Ministers has set an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for
Election as Judge to the ECtHR, which can advise the Contracting
Parties whether candidates for election as judges of the ECtHR meet
the criteria for office.7 According to the Resolution of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that established this
Panel, before submitting a list to the PACE, each Contracting Party
will forward the names and CVs of the intended candidates to the
Panel. If the Panel finds that all of the persons put forward by a
Contracting Party are suitable candidates, no further comments will be
provided. Where it is likely the Panel may find one or more candidates
not suitable for office, the chair of the Panel contacts the Contracting
Party concerned to inform it or to request comments. This is done
confidentially. If the Contracting Party persists with its choice then the
views of the Panel are confidentially forwarded to the PACE.72 While
the creation of this panel is undoubtedly a positive development, it
does not prevent the Contracting Parties from submitting inadequate
candidates. The States are not bound by the conclusions of the Panel,
as it is a merely advisory panel, and can submit their list even if it
received negative feedback. That said, the fact that the opinion of the
Panel will become known to the PACE raises the chances the
Contracting Parties will take its recommendations seriously.
69. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON THE
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE POST OF JUDGE AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS - EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (2012), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDo
c.jsp?id=1919201&Site=CM.
70. LIMBACH, supra note 14, 5 - 6.
71. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION CM/RES(2010)26 ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ADVISORY PANEL OF EXPERTS ON CANDIDATES FOR
ELECTION AS JUDGE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at para. 11 (Nov.
10, 2010) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1704555&Site=CM.
72. Id. at para. 5.
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The abovementioned guidelines on the selection of candidates do
not only contain a longer list of criteria for the office but also
enshrine procedural recommendations of the national nomination
process. The explanatory memorandum to these guidelines provides
the States should have:
[A] stable and established procedure [which] reflects the rule of law
principles of transparency and consistency, and thus also legal
certainty. Applicants and the general public should be able to rely
upon a certain procedure being followed, although that procedure
need not be the same for every successive selection process. The
need for accessibility of details of the procedure reflects the
principle of transparency. Applicants and the general public should
be able to know in advance the procedure that will be followed.7 3
These rules should be endorsed because they increase the
chances the most skilful individuals will be selected. However, as was
rightly pointed by the Consultative Council of European Judges,
"what is critical is not the perfection of principle .. . it is the putting
into full effect of principles already developed." 74 Even after the
guidelines had been adopted some nomination procedures remain
non-transparent and vulnerable to political manipulation.7 5  Some
73. CouNCIL OF EUROPE, MINISTERS' DEPUTIES, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM.
GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES
FOR THE POST OF JUDGE AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1919201&Site=CM.
74. CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, FOR THE ATTENTION OF
THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ON STANDARDS
CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE IRREMOVABILITY OF
JUDGES, OPINION No. 1, (2001), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2001)O
P1&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorlnternet=F
EF2EO&BackColorlntranet=FEF2EO&BackColorLogged=c3c3c3.
75. "With a few exceptions, governments shunned any public advertising for
candidates. In a few cases they advertised within a closed circle. Some seem even to
have taken unsolicited applications into account." LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 67-68.
Loucaides further argues that "[t]here were countries in which the selection was
made on the basis of criteria such as the friendly relations of the candidate with
influential political personalities or the affiliation of the person proposed with the
political party in power." Loucaides, supra note 67. Human Rights Watch sent a
letter to the ECtHR regarding pitfalls in nomination of candidates from Russia in
2012. The letter mentions the following: very brief contest period, the contest was
not broadly advertised, lack of transparency in relation to the selection committee
and the fact that civil society was not at all consulted. Letter from Hugh Williamson,
Executive Director Human Rights Watch, to Klas de Vries, Chairman of Sub-
Committee on Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights (Apr. 11,
2012), available at http://www.hrw.org /news/2012/04/11/letter-european-court-
human-rights-regarding-selection-procedure-candidates-russian-
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states treat their national judges in international tribunals as their
76
ambassadors aiming to promote their interests. This ideology is
totally unacceptable in the context of human rights courts, and this
should be clearly and consistently emphasised by the Council of
Europe.
The Council of Europe should ensure the nomination process
includes as many stakeholders as possible in order to lend credibility
to the process. The following criticism of the current nomination
process should be properly addressed:
States rarely confer with civil society, such as human rights
organisations, bar associations and, perhaps most critically, judicial
bodies. In cases where civil society is consulted, the opaque nature of
procedures means that the impact of such consultations is unclear.77
However, the Council of Europe is limited in what it can do to ensure
implementation of the Guidelines and other relevant rules.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the judiciary of the ECtHR is
almost exclusively drawn from the initial list submitted by the
national Governments. Any manipulation of the process by political
actors is likely to seriously undermine the credibility of the court if it
brings the process itself into disrepute, or if it means less-than-
capable jurists are appointed for partisan reasons. Therefore, the
integrity of the process must be safeguarded as rigorously as possible.
2. Interview with the Candidates
After States nominate their candidates, the nominees proceed to
an interview conducted by the Sub-Committee on the election of
Judges to the European Court of Human Rights. In 2003 the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, of which the Sub-
Committee is part, presented a report that provided some guidance as
to the considerations the Sub-Committee should look to when
78
assessing a candidate. This report includes an assessment of the
"integrity and independence" of the candidate.7 9 However, the
interviews with the candidates are extremely brief and it is doubtful
the proper evaluation of a candidate for such an important position
76. Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 11, at 34.
77. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 18.
78. EUR. CONSULT. Ass., CANDIDATES FOR THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, (2003), http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=1034
8&Language=EN.
79. Id. at para. 56.
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can be completed in 15 minutes.8 o Given the fact that the 2003 report
indicated twelve separate criteria to consider, this leaves 1.5 minutes
to assess the nominee on each criterion.
Further criticism has been levelled at the personnel of the Sub-
Committee itself. Lord Hoffmann has emphasised the lack of legal
background of the members of the Sub-Committee.81 Head of Legal
Affairs and Human Rights Department of the Council of Europe
Andrew Drzemczewski informed the authors that the membership of
the Sub-Committee has changed considerably since the time when
Lord Hoffmann expressed his critique. According to Mr.
Drzemczewski, five out of sixteen members of the Sub-Committee
are former Ministers of Justice while one member is a former
Minister of Interior. Having said that the inclusion of independent
experts in the Sub-Committee would increase its legitimacy and
credibility.
The Sub-Committee also presents a potential arena in which
political influence can be brought to bear in the interview process
itself. This can again be remedied by implementing a more
transparent process. For example, the Sub-Committee should be able
to conduct a more profound check on the candidates beyond the
formal CV it is presented and prepare a report on each candidate.
This report, containing open source materials, should be available to
the members of the PACE before an election is held.
3. Election
The final stage of the appointment process is the election held by
the PACE. While judges elected by the members of the PACE cannot
claim the same level of democratic legitimacy as representatives
elected directly by people, this important stage can increase the
credibility of the judges. This is particularly important because mass
media often criticise the ECtHR judges as being unelected officials
82
challenging decisions of elected parliaments. The election of judges
80. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 5. It seems that currently interviews go for about
30 minutes, it nevertheless leaves very little time for an in-depth assessment of the
merits of the candidates. Often interviews for entry level positions at law firms can
last for a couple of days and the position of the ECtHR judge is considerably more
important than entry level law firm positions.
81. See generally, Lord Hoffmann, supra note 15, at 429.
82. "We may have become wearily accustomed to the crazy verdicts of the
unelectedEuropean Court of Human Rights, which appears to delight in taking sides
with rapists, murderers and terrorists against the British public. But even by the
standards of this pack of remote, often poorly qualified Eurocrats, today's judgment
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provides an additional mechanism for enhancing the legitimacy of the
Court .
Despite its legitimacy-enhancing potential, the election of judges
by the PACE has been criticised for two primary reasons. First, while
members of the PACE now possess basic information about the
relevant qualifications of the candidates, they lack sufficient
information to make an informed decision about the candidates'
suitability for the position. 4 Second, Member States lobby in favour of
85their preferred candidate.
One answer to the first criticism could be to prepare reports as
advocated above. Another option would be to ensure the
participation of the PACE members in the election beyond the report
of the Sub-Committee. A simple question and answer session would
give the members of the PACE more insight into the qualities of the
candidates and would allow them to make more informed choices.
The authors appreciate that the PACE sessions are very short and
have a very intensive agenda. However, potential workload cannot
overweigh the goal of ensuring that the nominees of sufficiently high
calibre are elected to the ECtHR.
A more transparent process also responds to criticism of the
ability of Member States to lobby for their preferred candidates.
When members of the PACE lacked sufficient information to make
an independent and informed choice, the national delegations often
86became the source of information about the nominees. The
in favour of Abu Qatada defies logic." James Slack, Unelected Euro Judges are
Bringing Terror to the Streets of Britain, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 18, 2012) (emphasis
added), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2087831/Abu-Qatada-human-
rights-Unelected-euro-judges-bringing-terror-streets-Britain.html#ixzz2Rs4oGlyD.
83. Nicolas Bratza, The Relationship Between the UK Courts and Strasbourg
Eur., HUM. RTs. L.REv. 505, 506 (2011).
84. The candidates are rarely much known across Europe because very well-
known lawyers are often reluctant to leave their domestic practice behind and go to
Strasbourg for 9 years. Judge Hedigan (a former judge elected in respect to Ireland)
in his interview explained that he had to leave his successful practice as a barrister in
Dublin for some vague career prospect as a Strasbourg judge elected in 1998 when
the permanent Court was just created. See TERRIS, supra note 1, at 214.
85. Some commentators argue that "[1]obbying by States, and occasionally by
judicial candidates, jeopardises the future independence (actual and apparent) of
judges." LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 9.
86. One of the members of the PACE has described the voting process prior to
the establishment of the Sub-Committee in the following terms: "We would be
presented with the names of three people. We would be told to vote for one of them
but, usually, no one told us anything about the three people. One could sometimes
obtain a little information from the delegation of the country whose judges we were
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possibility of partisan influence in such circumstances is obvious. The
solution is to provide sufficient information to the PACE that is
independently verified in order to ensure an informed decision can be
made without relying on information from backroom channels.
The election process can be manipulated by the Contracting Parties
through an opaque nomination process, through the provision of
insufficient information to the PACE, and through lobbying of the
members of the PACE. These issues have to be addressed in order to
ensure the independence of the Court. If the national representation
rule is abandoned, then the national interest in manipulating the process
dissipates. If it is not possible to get rid of the national representation
rule, these reforms will also increase the transparency of the whole
process, which is crucially important to maintain public trust in the
institution.87
B. Principle ofNational Representation and Ad-Hoc Judges
Article 26(4) of the ECHR states:
There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the
Grand Chamber the judge elected in respect of the High
Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is
unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a
list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of
judge.
This provision creates numerous threats to the judiciary of the
ECtHR. First, this provision creates an incentive for the Member
States to push to elect an individual who is most likely to act in the
State's interest. Second, Member States may be tempted to try to
sway the decision of a judge hearing a case. This seems to be a mainly
theoretical problem, as there is scant evidence such attempts have
been made. However, stakeholders may perceive this as a conflict
of interest, which creates a legitimacy problem for the court. Third, if
the judge cannot hear the case, the principle of appointing an ad-hoc
judge compounds the first two problems as ad-hoc judges are not
subjected to the same level of institutional scrutiny as permanent
judges
about to select. However, sometimes we would have been better off sticking a pin in
the piece of paper to determine our choice of vote. Indeed, on a number of occasions
I flatly refused to exercise the vote because I knew nothing about the candidates.
Lord Hardy of Wath, House of Lords, 592 HANSARD 81 (1998) (emphasis added).
87. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 345 - 346.
88. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 18.
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National representation is a principle that has been embraced by
many different international tribunals. For example, in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) both parties to the case is entitled
to have a judge of their nationality on the bench. There is a
significant difference between tribunals such as the ICJ and the
ECtHR. The former do not deal with individual complaints.90 If the
principle of equal representation were applied strictly to the ECtHR,
then individual complainants should also be afforded representation.
Applying this principle would undermine the legitimacy of the ECtHR,
and it demonstrates the inadvisability of extending a direct parallel
from other international tribunals to the ECtHR. Even in
international tribunals, national judges do not always act as a national
representative on the bench.91
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) is a
regional human rights body in which individuals can make claims
against States.9 The ECtHR is more similar to the IACtHR than the
ICJ. The issue of national representation was the subject of an
advisory opinion delivered by the IACtHR, which stated judges
nominated by a particular Contracting Party could not be on the
bench when this Contracting Party is a respondent in the case.93 This
89. Under art. 31, paras. 2 and 3, of the Statute of the Court, a State party to a
case before the International Court of Justice which does not have a judge of its
nationality on the Bench may choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc in that specific
case under the conditions laid down in arts. 35 to 37 of the Rules of Court. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 31(2)-(3), 35-37, June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also Judges Ad Hoc, INT'L CT. JUST.
(2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1&p2=5.
90. See Judges Ad Hoc, supra note 89; ICJ Statute, supra note 89 at art. 34, para. 1.
91. While there is no consensus among commentators on whether nationality
influences the voting of the judges it makes little difference to this discussion since
justice should not be only done but should be seen to be done. For more detailed
analysis of correlations between voting and nationality. See TERRIS, supra note 1, at
153; Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks by Rosalyn Tggins in Alternative Perspectives on the
Independence of International Courts, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 135, 137 (2005);
Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005); Lucius Caflisch, Independence and Impartiality of
Judges: The European Court of Human Rights, 2 LAW AND PRAC. INT'L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 169 (2003).
92. See art. 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, at 5 (Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R. Oct. 19, 2010).
93. The IACtHR stated that "the question of a judge's nationality is a factor that
must be taken into account by the Court to strengthen the perception of the judge's
impartiality . . . . [I]t is possible to conclude, with the same validity, that the titular
judge national of the respondent State must not participate in contentious cases
originated in individual petitions." Art. 55 of the American Convention on Human
[Vol. 37:2296
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approach should be adopted by the ECtHR.
The national representation rule also creates a procedural
anomaly when decisions are reviewed. The judge elected from a
particular Member State sits in the Chamber, but also in the Grand
Chamber if the case is reviewed. In this case the judge will be the one
to review her own decision made at the Chamber level.94
The text of the Convention itself makes clear that there is a
possibility that national representation may give rise to a perception
of bias. Article 26.3 states that when sitting as a single judge, the
judge cannot deal with applications which relate to the Member State
of which they are a national. This is clearly predicated on the basis
that such a situation would give rise to a perception of bias.
However, it is not clear how the perception of bias disappears when
the case proceeds to consideration on the merits; the judge still sits in
consideration of the case. The perception of bias is merely reduced
given the fact that the judge in question casts only one vote amongst
others. This still admits the underlying possibility of bias.
Moreover, there is some statistical evidence to indicate the
perception of bias may be more than a perception. In his survey of
decision-making in the ECtHR, Voeten observed national judges
voted in favour of their state in 24 out of 32 cases in which national
judges held the casting vote and did so in favour of their State in 24
instances. Voeten points out the "hung" nature of the decision means
the case was likely to be 50-50, and therefore the inclusion of the
national judge in these instances meant that national governments
likely avoided a finding of liability in 8 cases.95 Although this is a
statistically small number in the context of all of the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR, it was a considerable defeat for the applicants.
Even more invidious is the corollary of national representation
which provides for ad-hoc judges to be called when the elected judge
Rights (Argentina), Ser. OC-20, para. 84 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Advisory Opinion of Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/do
cs/opiniones/seriea 20_ing.pdf.
94. Pursuant to art. 23 of the ECHR, there shall sit as an ex-officio member of
the Chamber and the Grand Chamber, the judge elected in respect of the
Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge is unable to sit, a
person chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by that
Party shall sit in the capacity of judge. It often means that the same judge has to sit in
both Chamber and Grand Chamber hearings if the case was referred to the Grand
Chamber pursuant to art. 43 ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights, art.
23, Sept. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
95. Voeten, supra note 5, at 426.
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is not available or cannot sit in a particular case. These ad-hoc judges
do not enjoy all the protections of elected judges.96 Moreover, the ad-
hoc judges are more amenable to outside influence than elected
judges. Before Protocol 14 came into force the ad-hoc judges were
appointed by the State for a particular case. This was an inherently
problematic situation. Protocol 14 obliges the Contracting Parties to
submit a list of 3-5 names. This was a direct result of Ukraine's
actions, which resulted in appointing an ad hoc judge for a prolonged
period of time. In this case Ukraine submitted the list of three
candidates, then withdrawn this list and subsequently was not able to
submit the final list.97
Such manipulation undermined the independence and credibility
of the ECtHR. The procedure under Protocol 14 is therefore a
marked improvement, but even under the new procedure, there are
still Contracting Parties that have not yet submitted their lists98 and
some have been submitted with fewer than three names.99 The new
procedure has been criticised by the Council of Europe. According to
Protocol 14, if the list is submitted, then the President of the Court
selects one judge from the list for a particular case. The Report
prepared by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights by
the Council of Europe stated:
[T]he appointment procedure may still give rise to a legitimacy
problem in that the ad hoc judge is appointed from a list submitted
by the states parties directly to the President of the Court, whereas
the Assembly remains excluded from the process. Not only does
the procedure therefore lack democratic legitimacy, it is also
96. At the very minimum these judges do not live in Strasbourg and continue
working in their home states. Often their career is much more dependent on the
authorities than the careers of the permanent judges.
97. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, AD Hoc JUDGES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW. INFORMATION REPORT. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 3 (2012), http://www.coe.int/t/dgilbrighton-
conference/Documents/PACEdocuments/APDOC12827-EN.pdf; for more
background information on the issue See PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,
RECONSIDERATION ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS OF PREVIOUSLY RATIFIED
CREDENTIALS OF THE UKRAINIAN DELEGATION (RULE 9 OF THE ASSEMBLY'S RULES
OF PROCEDURE). REPORT. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2009), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xmli/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewHTML.asp?FilelD=12239&lang=EN.
98. See, e.g., Armenia, Denmark or Hungary. List of Ad Hoc Judges, EUR. CT.
HUM. RTs., (Mar. 20, 2014) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List-adhoc-jud
gesBIL.pdf.
99. See, e.g., Andorra or Spain. Id
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unclear how the President of the Court will choose the ad hoc judge
from the list provided by the state.10
The lack of criteria according to how the President of the Court
should select a judge for a particular case can create an impression
the decision was made arbitrarily.
These threats to the independence of the Court stem from the
principle of national representation. If this principle is removed, the
need to appoint ad-hoc judges disappears. The removal of the principle
would also eradicate any perceived bias in the decision-making process,
and would dissuade governments from manipulating the election
process.
One can argue a national judge is able to explain certain national
particularities, e.g. national background, laws, traditions, to other
judges. While it would be beneficial to have a national judge serve as
a resource to other judges, it is not clear why such a judge should be
allowed to vote. Furthermore, the appointment of a non-judicial
rapporteur, who could be a lawyer, or a national of the respondent
state, would also address this concern.
Tomuschat argues national representation is important because
States "must be able to trust that their legitimate concerns are taken
into account with the requisite care."101 It is not clear, however, what
concerns Tomuschat considers legitimate, but any expansion beyond
legal concerns, for example, diplomatic concerns would surely be
inappropriate for the judiciary to consider. Any legitimate legal
concerns can be met by the appointment of effective counsel to
appear before the court. Any such concerns should surely be
presented to the ECtHR during the course of argument.
Practical difficulties exist in securing the unanimous assent of the
Contracting Parties required to enact such a change. However, some
movement towards reform in this area is evident in the report by the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights:
The principle of 'national representation' and, hence, in most
100. EUR. PARL. Ass. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AD
Hoc JUDGES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEw, para. 14
(2011) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Judges Overview], http://www.assembly.coe.int/Comm
itteeDocs/2011/ajdoc36_2011.pdf.
101. Christian Tomuschat, National Representation of Judges and Legitimacy of
International Jurisdictions: Lessons from ICJ to ECJ? in THE FUTURE OF THE
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 6TH INTERNATIONAL
ECLN-COLLOQUIUM/IACL ROUND TABLE BERLIN, 2-4 NOVEMBER 2005 183, 184
(Ingolf Pernice, et al. eds. 2006).
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instances, the institution of an ad hoc judge, must be carefully
balanced against the risk posed to the Court by a lack of legitimacy
and independence of judges. The states parties, the Court and the
Assembly must all play a part in achieving this balance.102
In light of the foregoing analysis, this paper advocates the
removal of the principle of national representation in toto, in line
with the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The
legitimate concerns of the Member States can be met by the
appointment of non-judicial rapporteurs, or through the appointment
of a judge of that State in a non-voting capacity. A debate about the
existence of the "national representation" rule could reveal the views
of the Member States regarding the judicial independence of the
ECtHR. It could expose any State that still believes such a judge is
merely a national representative on the Court.
C. Social Secmity and Immunities
The removal of the national representation principle would
greatly reduce the likelihood Member States would be able to
manipulate the Court by influencing their own nationals. This paper
assumes that national representation will remain for the foreseeable
future because attempts to abandon it will require support of all 47
Contracting Parties. However, even if national representation is
abandoned, external actors can utilize other strategies to undermine
the Court. These will also be considered.
The keys to judicial independence depend largely on prosaic, yet
important concerns, including judicial salaries, pensions and
immunities. While ECtHR judges receive comparatively high
salaries,os the development of an equivalent network of support in
areas other than salaries is not as advanced. The judges of the
ECtHR do not have the status of national judges in some countries'04
and they are treated as unemployed insofar as national labour law is
105
concerned. This can have a detrimental effect on the retirement
prospects of the judge. In 2007, Judge Hedigan complained that
"[t]he conditions of work here [in the ECtHR] are extremely poor for
the judges, despite the fact that, like most people at international
level, they get a fairly high salary... judges have no social protection
102. Ad Hoc Judges Overview, supra note 97, at para. 37.
103. In 2004 the basic salary was EUR 177,912.
104. As such this is not a problem: the ECtHR judges are not national judges.
105. This is the case in Russia.
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at all. Indeed, they are treated almost as though they are
nonpersons!"106
A significant step forward in providing social protection for
judges was the adoption of the resolution of the Committee of
Ministers CM/Res(2009)5 on the Status and Conditions of Service
of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights and of the
Commissioner for Human Rights.107 This resolution confirmed
elected members of the Court should enjoy the special status of
"judges of the European Court of Human Rights." 08 This
resolution has clarified important aspects of social security such as
annual leave, sick leave, maternity and paternity leave, and
adoption leave. Perhaps the most important aspect of the
resolution was that it provided a pension scheme for the judges of
the ECtHR. Prior to the adoption of this measure, Mahoney
observed
[T]here is one international organisation which-at least at present
(October 2008)-signally fails to observe the minimum standard,
namely the Council of Europe. The failing is located, not in an
inadequacy of the pension, but in the total absence of any pension
at all for the full-time judges of the Strasbourg Court.109
Pursuant to Article 10 of the Resolution the judges receive
benefits from the Pension Scheme for staff members, which is in force
at the Council of Europe at the time of their appointment. This is a
106. TERRIS, supra note 1, at 214.
107. CommiTEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION (2009)5 ON THE STATUS AND
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF JUDGES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter
RESOLUTION (2009)5], https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1508697; for an overview
of social security and pension entitlement see COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, RESOLUTION (2013)34 ON THE NEED TO REINFORCE THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Introductory
Memorandum, 5 [hereinafter Introductory Memorandum] (available at
http://www.assemb ly.coe.int/Commi tteeDocs/2013/ajdoc34_2013.pdf).
108. See RESOLUTION (2009)5, supra note 107, at art. 1. It is a replication of the
statement enshrined in earlier Resolution (97)9 on the Status and Conditions of
Service of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights to be Set up under
Protocol no. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms adopted by the Committee of Ministers on September 10,
1997. Mahoney has criticised the latter resolution stating that art. 1 declares the
status but the Resolution "offers no further specification as to what this 'special
status' entails or consists of." Paul Mahoney, Separation ofPowers in the Council of
Europe/ The Status of the European Court of Human Rights vis-a-vis authorities of
the Council ofEurope, 24 HUM. RTs. L.J. 152, 160 (2011).
109. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 332.
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positive development in securing social benefits, and hence the
independence of the judges. The manner in which judges of the
ECtHR enjoy their office, in particular the fact that they can be elected
for only one 9-year term, makes an exact equivalence between judges
and other employees of the Council of Europe questionable, but the
provision of this scheme is undeniably better than having no provision
at all before.
The issue of the functional and personal immunity of the judges is
also crucial for ensuring the independence of the ECtHR. Pursuant to
Article 2 of the above mentioned Resolution, judges and ad hoc judges
shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to privileges and
immunities.110 According to Article 18 of the General Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe the judges are
immune from legal processes in respect of what they say in their official
capacity, they are exempt from taxation, and they are immune from
immigration restrictions. It is worth mentioning that all officials of the
Council of Europe enjoy these immunities. The Sixth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of
Europe specifically regulates judicial immunities. Pursuant to this
Protocol in addition to the above immunities the judges of the ECtHR,
their spouses, and minor children have the privileges and immunities,
exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance
with international law. This norm provides the judges with the same
privileges and immunities which are accorded to the Secretary General
and Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe.1 12 It seems
that the judges are well protected during their term in office-this
protection is guaranteed by the formal immunities and privileges but
also because they are based in Strasbourg"13 and in the majority of
cases are geographically detached from the pressures of their home
countries.
The judges should also be protected when their term in office is
over. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Sixth Protocol to the General
110. Resolution (2009)5, supra note 107.
111. General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe
(Sixth Protocol), 250 UTS 12&32 (1949) [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities],
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/162.htm. See Also
Introductory Memorandum, supra note 108, at 4-5.
112. Andrew Drzemczewski, A Major Overhaul of the European Human Rights
Convention Control Mechanism: Protocol 11, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 121, 195 (1995).
113. Resolution (2009)5, supra note 107.
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Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe,
"in order to secure for the judges complete freedom of speech and
independence in the discharge of their duties, the immunity from
legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done
by them in discharging their duties shall continue to be accorded,
notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer engaged in
the discharge of such duties.,114 It means as soon as the judge retires,
he or she is only immune in relation to what was said by this judge
during his term in office. All other immunities and privileges cease to
exist in his or her respect.
D. Tenure and Accountability
Harvey argues that tenure is a measure of judicial
independence."' The length of tenure is consistently considered one
of the aspects of judicial independence. Shelton notes that life tenure
is the least problematic from the point of view of independence.116
And while life tenure is unusual for international tribunals we submit
that it would be beneficial from the point of view of independence for
the Court if the judges were protected by irremovability.'17  If this
suggestion is rejected by the Contracting Parties, an alternative
solution can be adopted, namely providing a place for the former
ECtHR judges in the senior judiciary of the Member State.
Pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention the judges are elected
for a period of 9 years and cannot be reelected. This provision was
adopted by Protocol 14. Hitherto judges were elected for a period of
6 years but they could be reelected once. The possibility of re-
election was widely criticised as the main tool of influencing judges.11 s
114. See Privileges and Immunities, supra note 111.
115. Anne Harvey, What's So Great About Independent Courts? Reexamining
the Economic Effects of Judicial Independence, DEPT. OF POL. N.Y.U. (2011).
116. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence (1982); Shelton, supra note 15, at 38.
117. Irremovability is a standard requirement for national judges. The fact that
ECtHR is an international court does not provide a reason for lack of irremovability.
According to Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)12 which enshrines basic guarantees
for national judiciary. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION (2010)12 TO
MEMBER STATES ON JUDGES: INDEPENDENCE, EFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
para. 49 (2010), ("Security of tenure and irremovability are key elements of the
independence of judges. Accordingly, judges should have guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age, where such exists.") https://wcd.coe.int/ViewD
oc.jsp?id=1707137.
118. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tibunals and
the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 279 (2003); see
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They could be "punished" by the states for being too activist by not
being included in the list for reelection. It was pointed out that the
Bulgarian authorities had not included Judge Gotchev in the list of
candidates because of his vote in the Loukanov case.119 National
authorities did not necessarily have to hold out the possibility of
punishment in order to alter a judge's decision. Voeten found some
evidence that countries with fewer attractive career opportunities
available to judges after their tenure were more likely to decide in
favour of their States.120 After Protocol 14 came into force, the direct
threat of not being reappointed faded, but the problem Voeten
relates is not solved.
121Life tenure obviates this problem. Quite apart from the career
perspective concern one can argue that life tenure will also increase the
professional competence of the Court as a whole.122 In an ideal
situation new judges should be as competent in the area of ECHR law
as the judges who spent some time in Strasbourg. In reality it is likely
that new judges are less familiar with the modus operandiof the Court
123and need some time to learn the procedure.1  With life tenure the
judges will change less often meaning there will be fewer new
inexperienced judges. Another positive aspect of life tenure is that it
will better ensure consistency and continuity of case law, again due to
the fact that the judges will know the case law better. Finally, it has
been argued that the longer a judge stays in Strasbourg the more likel
"that judge becomes divorced from affinity towards the homeland."M
This would be a further guarantee of independence. We should specify
that under life tenure we mean tenure until retirement at the age of 65
or 70.
It has been argued that a 9 year term is too short to make a real
125impact. Moreover, the fact that the judges have to go back to their
also Voeten, supra note 5, at 427.
119. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 70.
120. Voeten, supra note 5, at 427.
121. Life tenure means that a retirement age can be stipulated.
122. Mahoney points out that "[e]ven more problematic is the issue of
underperforming. or incompetent judges, as opposed to judges guilty of impropriety."
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 344.
123. This is another criterion to be assessed by the Sub-Committee prior to
appointment, but it suffers from the same structural issues outlined above in relation
to assessment by the Sub-Committee.
124. Voeten, supra note 5, at 420.
125. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
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126
states creates further challenges to their independence. There are
suggestions that the judges that retire from the Court should have a
guaranteed position in the Contracting Party. One method of ensuring
the continued protection of judges from national pressure would be to
guarantee the individual would be appointed in a senior judicial
position in their home country. This is obviously a complex issue, given
inter alia that the number of judges varies wildly between Member
127States,12 but the suggestion could be trialled by a Committee of
Ministers recommendation and then migrate to the Convention if
successful. It is becoming increasingly recognised that the
embeddedness of the Convention in the national legal orders is the key
to the continued vitality of the Convention system.128 The proposed
change would ensure judges familiar with the Convention system
occupy high judicial office in the Member States and can act as
ambassadors for the ECtHR in the national judiciary. This is an
argument in favour of this proposal that is not based on purely judicial
independence concerns, and may cut against the arguments for life
tenure.
A minimum age requirement for the candidates for the position
of a judge has been discussed, but has not been implemented yet. If
life tenure is accepted it becomes even more important to implement
a minimum age requirement. Coupling this with life tenure could
enhance the credibilityl29 of the Court and contribute to the
acceptance of life tenure, because requiring a substantial amount of
experience will prevent judges from serving extremely long terms.
Drzemczewski rightly argues that
Although the Convention does not specify a minimum age for the
post of judge on the Court, it can be argued that such an age limit
ought to be imposed.... A requirement, as suggested by the former
Swedish judge on the Court, Elisabeth Palm, that candidates
possess at least 10 to 15 years of relevant work experience-which
126. Voeten's empirical study substantiates this point. Voeten, supra note 5, at
427; see also, Karlan, supra note 63, at 544; Mahoney, supra note 1, at 325.
127. These include areas such as the number of vacancies, technical requirements,
etc.
128. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Pnnciple of the European Human Rights
Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125 (2008).
129. It has been argued that sometimes the States have proposed candidates who
have been only recently out of law school. LIMBACH, supra note 14, at 16.
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implies a certain age requirement-merits serious consideration. 130
Some commentators suggest life tenure is not an ideal or even
feasible solution in the context of an international tribunal.13' New
judges may bring more up-to-date knowledge of local law and better
explain new developments in their legal systems. However, some
judges recently elected had long international careers working for
various international organisations, and following this logic, ties with
their national states would have diminished. 32 So, at least in respect
to these appointees, this argument does not stand. Furthermore, the
fact that national judges are invariably attached to cases involving
their home countries ensures they have some continued expertise in
the local law of the country. In general, life tenure can be a crucial
safeguard of the independence of the Court.133
If life tenure is accepted then the appointment procedure would
become even more important, and the changes related to these issues
would become even more pressing. Another pressing issue is the
accountability of the ECtHR judges. Accountability is not
understood here as responsibility for the decisions they make in
virtue of their discretion but rather accountability in a sense of
judicial ethics and carrying on their duties free of bias. In the most
extreme cases the judge can be dismissed from office for unethical
behaviour. According to Article 23 of the ECHR no judge may be
dismissed from office unless the other judges decide by a majority of
two-thirds that that judge has ceased to fulfil the required
conditions.'3
The procedure for dismissal is further specified in the Rules of
130. Andrew Drzemczewski, Election of Judges to the Strasbourg Court: an
Overview, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 377, 381 - 382 (2010).
131. Mahoney notes that "there is no dispute that the substitution of unlimited for
limited terms of office for international judges would be politically impossible."
Mahoney, supra note 1, 327.
132. Current Judges Paul Mahoney, Hanna Yudkivska and Mark Villiger as well
as former Judges Bratza, Loucaides, and Rozakis had international careers before
being elected to the bench.
133. Mackenzie and Sands argue in favour of tenure until retirement. While they
accept that there are certain concerns they conclude that these concerns are trumped
by the benefits to judicial independence. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands,
International Courts and Tibunals and the Independence of the International Judge,
44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 279 (2003). Shelton points out that "lifetime tenure or a
lengthy tenure with no possibility of reelection would enhance the independence of
judges and remove some of the political considerations that come with campaigns for
re-nomination and election." Shelton, supra note 15, at 38.
134. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 94, art. 24, para. 2.
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135Court, which are complimented by the Resolution on Judicial
Ethics adopted by the Plenary Court. The Resolution, for example,
prohibits engagement of the judges in activities outside the court
unless those activities are compatible with independence, impartiality
and the demands of their full-time office. Pursuant to the Resolution
judges must not accept any gift, favour or advantage that could call
their independence or impartiality into question.3 6
These legal documents are designed to ensure proper
accountability of judges. However, no judge has ever been dismissed
from an international tribunal for disciplinary reasons. Sometimes it is
suggested the mere existence of these norms is enough to deter the
judges from committing unethical acts.137 If the proposal of life
tenure for the judges is accepted then the accountability of sitting
judges should be taken even more seriously. Further consideration
should be given to the grounds of dismissal to include hitherto
unforeseen possibilities such as medical incompetence.
This section identified a number of areas which require reform.
The abolition of national representation is the most straightforward,
but also most politically difficult to secure. A more informed election
procedure, life tenure or appointment in the national legal system,
and further protection in relation to pensions can significarftly
improve the independence and credibility of the ECtHR.
IV. The Registry of the Court
The discussion of independence in the ECtHR focuses almost
exclusively on the independence of the judiciary. This is somewhat
misleading in that the judges rotate every 9 years, but the Registry of
the Court operates as its institutional memory. In order to assess the
impact of the Registry on the independence of the Court, this paper
will first consider the role the Registry plays in the operation of the
Court. It will then discuss three issues that can threaten the
independence of the Registry: it will first look at the lawyers of the
Registry seconded by the Contracting Parties; it will then discuss the
non-renewability of the B-lawyers contracts; and it will finally
135. EUR. CT. H.R., RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, 7 (2014) [hereinafter RULES OF
COURT], http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/rules-courteng.pdf.
136. EUR. Cr. H.R., RESOLUTION ON JUDICIAL ETHICS ADOPrED BY THE PLENARY
COURT (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ResolutionJudicialEthicsEN
G.pdf.
137. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 342 - 343.
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examine the institutional independence of the Registry from the
political organs of the Council of Europe. A survey of the practical
significance of the Registry in the work of the ECtHR demonstrates
the extent to which reform of the Registry is necessary in order to
avoid any possible damage to the Convention institutions.
A. The Role of the Registry
The Registry of the ECtHR is unseen, but it is heard. For the
majority of people it is unclear what the lawyers of the Registry do
and what their impact on the Court agenda and decision-making is.
While the judges are often in the spotlight, it is lawyers of the
Registry who prepare the cases and often draft the judgments.
The Registry is mentioned in the ECHR in Article 24 which
provides: the Court shall have a Registry, the functions and
organisation of which shall be laid down in the rules of the Court.
After Protocol 14 entered into force the members of the Registry
acquired a legal right to act as non-judicial rapporteurs assisting
138judges sitting as single judges. One crucial safeguard is that the
organisation of the Registry is undertaken by the Court itself. As
Sorel puts it, "self-regulation is the prevailing system, which implies
mutability of the rules of procedure within the framework of the
statute. This is an important source of independence and one of the
ways in which such a creature may escape its makers. "139
Formally the task of the Registry is to provide legal and
administrative support to the Court in the exercise of its judicial
functions. 40 In fact this role goes beyond simple administrative
support. The former judge of the ECtHR Loucaides explains the role
of the Registry in following terms:
In general, the substantial work-studying the application, the
documents attached to it, preparing the report and suggesting the
solution-was done by the member of the Registry. The extent of
intervention, supervision and work of the judge Rapporteur
depended on the personality, diligence and industry of the
particular judge. Not all the judges had such qualities. The result
138. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 94, at art. 24(2).
139. Jean-Marc Sorel, International Courts and Tribunals, Procedure, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA PUB. INT'L L. (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2009).
140. COUNCIL EUR., SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND
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was that the view of the member of the Registry frequently
prevailed; he or she gave the direction to the solution of the case;
i.e. whether the case should be declared admissible or inadmissible,
whether it should be communicated and whether a violation should
be found.141
The Registry seems to be able to crucially influence the judgments of
142the ECtHR; Loucaides calls its role decisive.
The importance of the Registry's role calls into question the
extent to which applicants feel that they can trust the legal system.
Tyler points out people only value participation if the authority
involved has considered their case.1 3 This can be allayed by
providing reasons for the decision, but a perception that the decision
has not been decided by the court can undermine this element of
procedural justice. Furthermore, Tyler notes the importance that
people ascribe to the neutrality of the decision-making process.m
The fact that the Registry is an important, and sometimes decisive,
element in the decision-making process makes any problem relating
to a lack of neutrality particularly troubling.
The Registry has a pyramid structure, with the Registrar and
Deputy Registrar(s) on the top, other lawyers working in the sections
and finally the grade B-lawyers. Each lawyer is assigned to the
country of which they are a national. This means the structure and
roles of individual lawyers varies depending on the number of such
lawyers assigned to a country, the size of the national backlog and
other factors. B-lawyers often deal with clearly inadmissible cases,
they do preliminary filtering of the applications. 1 45  B-lawyers are
usually employed on a temporary basis, typically receiving four-year
nonrenewable contracts. A-lawyers are usually permanently
employed and often deal with more important meritorious cases.
This paper argues that the independence of the Registry requires
greater discussion. Taking into account its influence on the Court, it
is important to maintain public trust in the Registry.
141. Loucaides, supra note 67.
14 2. Id.
143. Tyler, supra note 59, at 889.
144. Id. at 892.
145. Special filtering sections were set in relation to applications, which arrive
from five of the highest case-count countries: Russia, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine and
Poland.
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B. Seconded Lawyers of the Registry
It is commonly accepted that the Court faces an unsustainable
backlog of pending applications. One possible solution to alleviate
the backlog is to increase the number of the lawyers working at the
Registry. Following the Interlaken and Izmir Declarations, the
Contracting Parties were encouraged to send seconded lawyers to the
Court's Registry.146 This idea was supported by the Court; the
Registry of the Court even sent an information note to the
representatives of the Contracting Parties requesting they provide
seconded lawyers to the Court's Registry.147 The aim of tackling the
backlog is very pressing but the means of solving this problem should
not compromise the independence of the Court.
Before turning to the arguments pro and contra having seconded
lawyers in the Registry, some terminological clarification is needed.
Seconded lawyers are funded by the Contracting Parties; in other
words, their salaries are paid directly by the Contracting Party. Often
these salaries are smaller than salaries of regular employees of the
Council of Europe - this on its own can contribute to an unhealthy
environment in the Registry. The shortlisting of the candidates is also
done by the Contracting Party. The seconded lawyers are finally
selected by the Court from the shortlisted candidates. Their contract
usually lasts two years and it is non-renewable. It should be noted that
seconded lawyers worked in the Court even before the Interlaken
Declaration.14 For instance, Sweden has been seconding judges to the
ECtHR for a long period of time. However, the number of seconded
lawyers has increased significantly after the Interlaken Declaration.
Russia, for example, sent 20 lawyers to work in the Court's Registry.149
146. COUNCIL EUR., INTERLAKEN DECLARATION: HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1591969; COUNCIL EUR., IZMIR DECLARATION:
HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS - APRIL 26-27 (2011), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=IzmirDeclarat
ion&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorlnternet=DBDCF
2&BackColorlntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
147. Information Note from the Registrar. Secondment to the Registry of National
Lawyers, EUR. CT. HUM. RTs. (Aug. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Information Note],
http://www.justice.gov.sk/SiteAssets/Lists/Aktuality/EditFormlinformat%C3%ADvn
a%20n%C3%B3ta.pdf
148. See, e.g., Letter from Erik Freiberg, Registrar of the ECHR, to Oleg Orlov,
Head of Council of the Human Rights Centre, Memorial (Dec. 5, 2011) [hereinafter
Letter from Freiberg], available at http://www.memo.ru/eng/news/2011/12/29/2912
113.pdf; See Also Introductory Memorandum, supra note 107, at 7-8.
149. Freiberg, supra note 148.
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The Registrar of the Court explained the purpose of secondment is
twofold: "on the one hand, it provides the Court with the assistance of
experienced national lawyers with full knowledge of national legal
systems; on the other, it feeds back into the national system
Convention trained lawyers and therefore promotes more effective
national implementation." 5 0
This initiative has not received universal endorsement. Russian
civil society has reacted immediately and negatively. For example,
one of the leading Russian NGOs, Memorial, sent a letter to the
Registrar of the Court questionin the real and perceived
independence of the seconded lawyers.
In response to these concerns, the Registrar of the Court has
advanced the following rationales to demonstrate seconded lawyers
remain independent: first, they have to observe the Court's rules on
confidentiality and, upon arrival, take the same oath or make the same
solemn declaration as Registry staff; second, this practice existed for
many years; third, the final selection will be undertaken by the Court;
fourth, the candidates should be highly qualified and should speak
English and French.152 While some of these reasons possess merely
symbolic value, the fact that the Court makes the final selection cannot
be ignored.
A number of judges of the ECtHR were questioned about their
perception of the independence of seconded lawyers. Judges and
lawyers from new democracies were much more concerned about
independence of the seconded lawyers than judges elected from more
mature Western democracies. Some admitted they had initial
concerns, but have since been reassured by the role of the Court in
the appointment process.153 However, one judge believed that
members of the general public who do not have this internal
knowledge might question the perceived independence of such
lawyers, particularly given there are "very few people who really
know the ins and outs of the court." 154 If such perceptions were to
become widespread, they could potentially undermine the legitimacy
of the Court.
Secondment is widespread in various international organisations
150. See Information Note, supra note 147.
151. Id.
15 2. Id.
153. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou Interviews with the Judges of the ECtHR.
154. Id
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and it has a long pedigree in the political bodies of the Council of
Europe. 15 However, there is a crucial difference between
international political organisations and international tribunals.
Secondments to the former can provide a useful operational fillip for
these organisations; secondments to the latter can be detrimental.
International organisations typically are composed of a number of
disparate interests and one key concern of such organisations is the
accommodation of such interests. Therefore seconded members of
international organisations provide an informational channel about
the interests concerned. The role of the ECtHR is to adjudicate
human rights disputes, not to accommodate conflicting interests.
Another reason that is often advanced by the Registry of the
ECtHR in favour of seconded lawyers is that such lawyers are dealing
with clearly inadmissible cases. These are the cases which have
already been looked at and no human rights violations were
preliminarily identified, but because these cases had complex facts,
they were not disposed of immediately.156 The task of the seconded
lawyers is to bring these cases to completion. 57
There is an inherent controversy in the use of seconded lawyers.
It aims to feed well trained lawyers back into the national legal
system-lawyers who are aware of the ECHR standards. However, it
is hardly possible to learn these standards by routinely disposing of
inadmissible complaints. The aim of secondment could be most
effectively achieved if the seconded lawyers were national judges and
were allowed, under supervision, to deal with the gamut of issues an
ordinary lawyer of the Registry deals with. This will be the most
effective way to embed the norms of the Convention into the
domestic legal order. The internalisation of Convention norms by the
national judiciary would provide an important conduit for the
dissemination of Convention jurisprudence. Also it is likely national
judges will be more independent from the state than lawyers who
might, for example, work as part of the civil service of the State.
The possible controversy of the seconded lawyer scheme means
more open debate is needed to discuss this scheme. This concern is
reflected in the initiative of some members of the PACE, who tabled
155. The Council of Europe has recently adopted regulations for secondments to
the Council of Europe. Eur. Consult. Ass,. Resolution CM/Res(2012)2, 1134th Sess.,
(Feb. 15, 2012).
156. See Letter from Freiberg, supra note 148.
157. Id.
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a motion for a resolution entitled "Need to Reinforce the
Independence of the European Court of Human Rights." This
motion observed that
[Tihe Brighton Declaration of 20 April 2012, adopted at the recent
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights, underlined the need of maintaining a high-quality Registry,
with lawyers chosen for their legal qualifications and knowledge of
the law and practice of States Parties, and encouraged greater use
of secondments of national judges and lawyers. But situations may
occur in which serious complaints against a given State may be
dealt with by a seconded judge/lawyer who is paid by the State
against which applications are lodged and/or whose professional
career may depend on the State concerned. Such a situation may
create an intrinsic conflict of interest that can have an adverse
impact on the effective independence of the Court. 58
While having independent national judges as seconded lawyers who
are supervised by experienced members of the Registry seems to be
the most beneficial arrangement, it is clear that further consideration
should be given to how seconded lawyers can affect the independence
of the Registry.
C. Recruitment Policy
While the independence of regular lawyers is less problematic
than seconded lawyers, the recruitment procedure poses challenges to
the continued independence of the Registry. A major portion of the
lawyers of the ECtHR are employed on the basis of 4-year
nonrenewable contracts.15 This is a blanket rule which provides no
exceptions and in which merit plays no role. This rule is relevant to
the B-lawyers who normally deal with applications that have just been
submitted to the ECtHR (there are currently more than 100,000
pending applications). 160 The role of B-lawyers is not decisive, but it
is extremely important. They are at the forefront of the Court's
attempts to reduce its enormous docket. However, the fact that every
158. Eur. Parl. Ass., Motion for a Resolution. Need to Reinforce the
Independence of the European Court of Human Rights, 3rd Part-Sess., Doc. No.
12940 (2012).
159. This system is called the Young Lawyers Scheme. See Mahoney, supra note
16, at 346.
160. The Court's backlog in 2012 was approximately 128,100 pending applications.
EUR. Cr. HUM. RTs., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 149 (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/D
ocuments/Annual-report_2012_ENG.pdf.
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four years the Court has to train new inexperienced lawyers means
they are not efficient in tackling the backlog. At the same time well-
trained, experienced lawyers who worked at the Court for four years
are forced to leave irrespective of whether they wish to do so.
The rationale behind this seemingly counter-intuitive human
resources policy can be found in a broader social role the ECtHR
claims to play. The experienced lawyers leaving the Court after 4
years of service are seen as ambassadors who are supposed to bring
the values of the ECHR to the member states. However, it does not
always work this way. Frequently, former lawyers of the ECtHR start
working in other international organisations without any considerable
impact on their home countries. Some of them remain in Strasbourg,
studying at the University of Strasbourg or working at the law firms
or NGOs.161 Of course, the Court should attempt to improve human
rights in the Member States not only through their judgments but
through training of well qualified personnel who return to the
Member States. However, even those B-lawyers who come back to
the Member States are unlikely to create a critical mass of 'new
informed lawyers' that can support structural changes in the Member
162States due to an overall insignificant number of them.
This policy is questionable not only from the point of view of the
effectiveness of the Court, but also because it raises issues related to
the independence of such lawyers. It seems logical for the lawyers in
the last year of their term in the Court to look for a new job. Their
career perspectives may be dependent on various considerations
including loyalty to a particular state institution or private party. As a
result of these considerations, the policy of non-renewability of the
contracts should be changed and there should at least remain the
possibility that the B-lawyers' contracts could be extended.
D. Administrative Autonomy of the ECtHR from the Political
Bodies of the Council of Europe
This article has been primarily concerned with the ways in which
Member States can undermine the independence of the ECtHR and
the Registry. However, there is also an institutional threat to the
161. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, One of the Keys to the ECtHR Problems, HUM.
RTS. IRELAND (Sept. 11, 2012), http://humanrights.ie/announcements/one-of-the-
keys-to-the-ecthr-problems/.
162. This can be contrasted with the position of judges who return to Member
States and occupy a senior position in a relatively numerable, but highly influential,judicial role.
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independence of the ECtHR from the political bodies of the Council
of Europe. The Council of Europe is the ECtHR's parent
organisation. Lawyers and assistants working in the Court's Registry,
for instance, are considered staff members of the Council of Europe
and are subject to the Council of Europe's Staff Regulations.163 The
Court's budget is part of the general budget of the Council of
Europe.'6
The ECtHR is closely linked to other institutions of the Council
of Europe such as the PACE or the Committee of Ministers at least
165in the areas of finances and human resources. Some argue because
the ECHR was drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
it is logical and appropriate that the Court is dependent on its parent
institution to some extent. This argument is not very convincing. The
Council of Europe does not have propriety rights in every treaty
which was signed under the umbrella of this organisation. Kruger and
Polakiewicz argue that, "the Convention is not an act of the Council
itself, but an independent international treaty which may contain
special regulations going beyond the Statute's provisions."1
Drzemczewski agreed, noting that "[o]nly those links with the
Council of Europe which are explicitly foreseen by the Treaty itself,
maintain it in the sphere of the Organisation." 1 67  Moreover,
Mahoney has conducted a comprehensive historical overview of the
relations between the Council of Europe and the ECtHR and
concluded the Council of Europe de facto acknowledged the
independence of the Court's Registry from the moment it was
established. 68
163. Registry, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.in
t/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014).
164. Budget, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECH
RIEN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/Budget/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2014).
165. Lambert-Abdelgawad E, The Court as a Part of the Council of Europe: the
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, in CONSTITUTING EUROPE
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
CONTEXT 291, 291-292 (Follesdal A., Peters B., and Ulfstein G. eds. 2013).
166. Hans Christian Kruger & Jorg Polakiewicz, Proposals for a Coherent Human
Rights Protection System in Europe/The European Convention on Human Rights
and The Charter of Fundamental Rights, 22 HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 12 (2001).
167. Andrew Drzemczewski, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations:
Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of Europe, in THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 139-177 (Linos-Alexander Sicilianos ed., 2001).
168. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 153 -159.
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Many commentators including the current Registrar of the Court
point out that normally the relations between the ECtHR and the
Council of Europe are cooperative and mutually beneficial. In some
cases misunderstandings between the ECtHR and the Council of
Europe have led to 'inefficient management of resources.' 169
Furthermore, in times of economic crisis the tensions between
institutionso7 0 might become aggravated due to tightening fiscal
constraints. Mahoney points out that
[I]n recent years, within the Council of Europe, there have been
disquieting signs of a tendency to swim against this universal tide
[of the operational independence of international courts], through
revived attempts by the executive arm of the Council of Europe to
assume ultimate responsibility, in place of the Court, for staff
appointments and structures, for budgetary preparations, for
internal working methods, and so on.
One solution to these problems of misunderstanding and power
balancing would be to subordinate the Court's Registry to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. This logistical solution
is totally unacceptable from the point of view of the rule of law. The
Council of Europe is an organisation of states: it does not claim it is
completely independent from its Member States. Arguably, such
independence is not only unnecessary but is positively undesirable in
the case of the Council of Europe, because it is an arena for political
negotiations and for promoting human rights, rule of law and
democracy via political routes. However, the nature of the ECtHR is
different and the fact that independence is crucial component of the
Court has been established in section 1 of this paper. Therefore, the
Court must be independent not only from the influence of the
Contracting Parties per se but also from "the political entities that are
the Secretary General and the Committee of Ministers." 172
This paper does not advocate a complete separation between the
ECtHR Registry and the political arms of the Council of Europe.
The Committee of Ministers, the PACE and the Secretary-General
play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the Convention
169. Erik Fribergh, The Authority over the Court's Registry within the Council of
Europe Human Rights - Strasbourg View, in LIBER AMICORUM Luzius WILDHABER
146 (Lucius Caflisch et al. eds. 2007); see also, Mahoney, supra note 108, at 159.
170. See Fribergh, supra note 169, 154-155 (discussion of practical examples of
such challenges).
171. Mahoney, supra note 16, at 347.
172. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 158.
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system. The Committee of Ministers, for instance, supervises the
execution of the Court's judgments. The symbiotic nature of the
Convention system renders a divorce of the ECtHR Registry and the
political branches of the Council undesirable. That being said, the
Court's autonomy should be protected.
This article suggests the institutional autonomy of the ECtHR
Registry can be secured by the articulation of clear and
straightforward rules of interaction between the Registry on one side
and the Secretariat General and the Committee of Ministers on the
other.173 Until now the relations between the Council of Europe and
the ECtHR were based on ad hoc rules and de facto support of the
Court from the Secretary Generals. 74 The growth of the Court's
importance means a more coherent legal architecture governing
relations between the ECtHR and the Council of Europe is
necessary. Such rules can be established through the formal
agreement between the ECtHR and the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the Organisation of American States came to a similar agreement. 75
It has been suggested that the Statute of the Council of Europe
should also reflect the importance of the ECtHR.176 The Statute was
drafted before the ECtHR came into existence. Nowadays, the Court
is arguably the most prestigious institution in the Council of Europe,
and this state of affairs has to be reflected in its "Constitution"-the
Statute.
Two areas that would certainly require regulation in such a
scheme are the Court's autonomy on the issues of human resources
and financial independence. The discussion of the Court's
173. "As the President of the Court, Judge Luzius Wildhaber, said ... to the Wise
Persons' Group: 'There is a striking gap in the Council of Europe's institutional
arrangements, which lack a clear text setting out the Court's status and its
relationship with its staff. The plain terms of the Convention have yet to be reflected
in an appropriate instrument at Council of Europe level." Mahoney, supra note 16,
347.
174. Fribergh, supra note 169, at 155.
175. See generally Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the
Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, Agreement between
the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on the Administrative Operation of the Court's
Secretariat, May 7 1998, OEA/Ser.G CE/GCI-134/98 (discussing in pertinent part,
the "Principle of 'juez natural' the competent, independent, and impartial judge or
court") available at http://www.summit-americas.org/CEGCI% 20Docs/ce-gci-134-98-
English.htm.
176. Mahoney, supra note 16, 347.
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independence in relation to human resources usually covers the
following themes:
1. Should members of Registry be considered Council of
Europe staff? At present the lawyers of the Registry are staff
members of the Council of Europe, however there are convincing
arguments against the status quo. Presently Registry staff members
have to take the oath or make the solemn declaration expressing their
loyalty to the Court (not only to the Council of Europe). 179 This is
because the lawyers of the Registry should be independent, not only
from their individual States, but from the political branches of the
Council of Europe.
The unity of the Council of Europe staff can arguably be
undermined by this 'special status' of the ECtHR staff especially in
relation to staff mobility-transfers from the Court to various bodies
of the Council of Europe.18o This argument however is questionable
for at least two reasons. First, as was eloquently pointed out by Paul
Mahoney, other international tribunals maintain separate staff from
their parent organisations without undermining the unity of staff
between these organisations. 18 Second, even if there will be some
distancing between the Council and the Court, the latter is a special
body which should be autonomous, and this justifies such 'distancing.'
Unity of staff is a positive feature of the Strasbourg system, and both
177. "Members" of the Registry include assistants, IT services, and other
administrative personnel.
178. The ECtHR website states: "Registry staff members are staff members of the
Council of Europe, the Court's parent organisation, and are subject to the Council of
Europe's Staff Regulations." Registry, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS, http://www.echr.coe.i
nt/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry/.
179. RULES OF THE COURT, supra note 135 (The oath/solemn declaration of the
Members of the Registry is the following: "I solemnly declare (I swear) that I will
exercise loyally, discreetly and conscientiously the functions conferred upon me as an
official of the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights." Pursuant to
Article 25 of Staff Regulations of the Council of Europe all other employees of the
Council of Europe make the following solemn declaration: "I solemnly declare that I
will carry out the duties entrusted to me as a member of the staff of the Council of
Europe loyally and conscientiously, respecting the confidence placed in me. In
discharging these duties and in my official conduct I will have regard exclusively to
the interests of the Council of Europe. I will not seek or receive any instructions in
connection with the exercise of my functions from any government, authority,
organisation or person outside the Council. I will refrain from any action which
might reflect upon my position as a member of the staff of the Council or which
might be prejudicial morally or materially to the Council.").
180. Mahoney, supra note 16, at 347.
181. Id.
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the Court and the Council of Europe should benefit from transfers of
highly qualified lawyers; however this unity is not a sufficient trade-
off compared to possible damage it may cause to the perceived
independence of the Court.
2. The special status of the Court's Registry staff is closely
connected to the issue of which body the staff members should
answer to. As Paul Mahoney puts it "[i]t is surely indisputable that
the staff of the Registry should be answerable only to the Court and
not to the Secretary General or, ultimately through the Secretary
General, to the Committee of Ministers, both of which are political
entities."1 82 Paul Mahoney articulated this argument in 2003. In 2011
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted
Resolution CM/Res(2011)9 which has amended the Staff Regulations
of the Council of Europe, and certain staff management powers were
transferred from the Secretary General to the Registrar of the Court.
These powers include authority to make appointments and
183promotions, powers related to authorising secondary activities,
accepting gifts and other advantages,M  and even imposing
disciplinary measures. s Having said that, the staff members of the
Registry are still ultimately answerable to the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe since the above mentioned Resolution has not
amended Article 2 of the Staff Regulations, which provide that staff
members of the Council answer to, and are under the authority of the
186Secretary General. Some improvements have been made in the
status of the employees of the ECtHR but this process should be
continued.
3. Election of the Registrar and Deputy Registrar(s) of the
Court. One of the important safeguards of the independence of the
ECtHR is the competence of the Court to elect its Registrar and
182. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 158.
183. COMMIrrEE OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION AMENDING THE STAFF
REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO DELEGATION OF STAFF MANAGEMENT POWERS TO




186. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STAFF REGULATIONS, art. 2 (1981) ("Staff members of
the Council shall be under the authority of the Secretary General and answerable to
him or her. Hierarchical superiors in the Secretariat shall exercise their authority in
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Deputy Registrar(s). This authority is laid down in the Rules of
Court which provide that the plenary Court shall elect its Registrar
187and Deputy Registrar(s). However, according to Article 26 of the
regulations on appointments in the Council of Europe the Registrar
of the ECtHR shall be elected by the Plenary Court after the
President has obtained the opinion of the Secretary General. The
Rules of Court do not require the Court to obtain the Secretary
General's opinion on this matter. In 2007 the Registrar of the Court,
Erik Fribergh, drew attention to this legal mismatch and urged the
Council* of Europe to amend the regulations. However, the
difference between the Rules of Court, which reflect the real practice
of the election procedure,'89 and the Council of Europe Regulations
on appointment has not been rectified.
This short study does not aim to exhaust all possible points of
disagreement between the Secretary General and the ECtHR in the
area of human resources. Its main purpose is to show these issues
exist, and that clear regulations which reflect the Court's special
status as an independent tribunal should be adopted by the Council of
Europe. Even in areas where improvements have been made, points
of contention remain.
Another crucial aspect necessary to ensure the survival of an
independent court is to provide an adequate budget. The Court's
website gives the following information on the budget of the ECtHR:
According to Article 50 of the European Convention on Human
Rights the expenditure on the European Court of Human Rights is
to be borne by the Council of Europe. Under present
arrangements the Court does not have a separate budget, but its
budget is part of the general budget of the Council of Europe. As
such it is subject to the approval of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe in the course of their examination of the
overall Council of Europe budget.190
Mahoney points out that while the pre-1998 Court did not
question the budgetary competence of the Committee of Ministers it
187. Rules of Court, supra note 135, Rule 15(1).
188. Fribergh, supra note 169, at 155.
189. Id.
190. Budget, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., (Mar. 20, 2014) ("The Court's budget for 2014
amounts to 67,650,400 euros. This covers Judges' remuneration, staff salaries and
operational expenditure . . . It does not include expenditure on the building and
infrastructure . . . .") http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitwo
rks&c=#newComponent 1346157778000_pointer.
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"prevented the Court from for example, deciding on the creation or
upgrading of posts . . . ."191 One option to promote judicial
independence from the political institutions of the Council would be
to provide the Court the power to maintain a completely independent
budget from the Council of Europe. This solution is superficially
appealing, but is sub-optimal as it risks the possibility of external
influence by the Contracting Parties by threatening the independent
budget of the Court without thereby calling into question the budget
of the Council of Europe. That is, an independent Court budget
which is dependent on Member States' contributions provides a
potential means by which Member States' can register their
displeasure with a decision of the court. Furthermore, conflicts over
budgeting could lead to unseemly disputes between the Court and
Member States. This paper argues the Court should have a "ring-
fenced," or guaranteed, portion of the overall budget of the Council
of Europe. Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad points out that "[i]t
would ... be desirable for the ECtHR to co-decide on its own budget
or, at least, to have the competence to propose it; the lack of financial
autonomy is dangerous and could jeopardise the capacity of the Court
to perform its functions in the future." 192  Therefore, certain
autonomy is necessary within the Council of Europe budget.
The importance of the Registry to the institutional competence of
the Court should not be underestimated. Therefore, any consideration
of the institutional independence of the Court must also incorporate a
consideration of the role of the Registry. This section has addressed
the use of seconded lawyers by the Registry, the tenure and financial
provisions relating to the Registry, and considered the position of the
Registry in relation to the wider Council of Europe system.
V. Conclusion
Independence begets legitimacy begets effectiveness. While
some scholars believe independence should be subordinated to the
interests of Contracting Parties, we argue that the independence of
international human rights tribunals is a key component in ensuring
their legitimacy.
191. Mahoney, supra note 108, at 159.
192. Elisabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad, The Court as a part of the Council of
Europe: the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, in
CONSTITUTING EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CONTEXT 263, 292-293 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds. 2013).
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The protection of judicial independence in the ECtHR has
typically focused on a corollary to the formal requirements of the rule
of law-fixity of tenure, and the guarantee of salary. More recently,
however, there has been a burgeoning recognition that such formal
indicia fail to recognise both the ancillary considerations related to
judicial office, and the fact that threats to the independence of the
court can both pre- and post-date the judicial term of office. This
article has argued that the abandonment of the system of national
representation removes an unfavourable incentive for Member States
to elect partisan nominees and also eliminates the challenges of the
ad hoc judge procedure. Moreover, an appropriate system of judicial
election should be predicated on the fundamental norm of
transparency.
Judicial tenure itself is threatened by the limited term of office
and the implications for judges once that term has ended. This is an
invidious form of pressure, which necessitates a concerted response
by the institutions of the Council of Europe. A judge who is
uncertain of their future once they leave the bench cannot be fully
independent. A system which provides either for life tenure, or
where judges can rely on a guarantee of judicial appointment in the
national system would remove this uncertainty. Furthermore, the
return of judges to the national system provides an important
normative role in that system whereby the returning judges help
embed the ECHR in the domestic legal system of that country.
Finally, this article considered the position of the Registry in the
ECtHR. The importance of the Registry is difficult to overstate.
Independence under the Convention is rooted in the independence of
the Registry. This independence is threatened by the recent increase
in the appointment of B-lawyers and seconded lawyers. Moreover,
the Registry should preserve a measure of autonomy from the
political branches of the ECHR.
The judicial independence of the ECtHR is in purgatory. It is
insufficiently protected against the winds that buffet it, yet it retains
sufficient formal protection to provide the chimera of stabile
independence. Reform of the institutions of the ECtHR is necessary
to ensure such winds do not threaten the cornerstone of the ECHR
system itself.
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